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See, as funny as that joke about french incompetence is, the French fully expected the Germans to invade them through Belgium. Indeed, the Maginot line did extend all the way to the sea, though it wasn't as extensive along the Belgian border as it was in Elsace-Lorraine. The french plan for WW2 was to use Maginot not as a defensive position, but to convince the Germans to invade through Belgium, where they had prepared defensive positions intended to hold the Germans off, which were indeed manned by the French at all times until Britain sabotaged the Franco-Belgian alliance and forced Belgium into neutrality, so the plan was adjusted so as to station troops on the border, advance rapidly, and then hold the Germans off from there. This, however, was the first of many mistakes in french strategic planning. They had utterly underestimated the speed at which the German Army would advance into Belgium, such that many of the defensive positions that were supposed to hold the Germans off had been overrun before the French had the chance to man them.
The second big mistake was not to take reports about German tanks in the Ardennes seriously, because yes, they did have reports about this. But once again, the speed and agility of German tanks had been underestimated, and the report dismissed. (keep in mind that the French didn't have dedicated tank divisions the way the Germans did; they intended to use their tanks the same way they had in WW1, as big land ships that would break through enemy trenches and open up a chance for infantry to advance, rather than the tip of a rapid offensive that was more in line with the mobile warfare that had proven itself successful for Germany in the latter years of WW1).
To understand how Rommel's Dash to the Channel happened, we need to talk about commanding by order vs. commanding by task. See, there are two basic models to lead an army. The French followed the doctrine of command by order. In this model, an officer is merely an extension of the generals in HQ. These generals draw up plans, and the officer is to make sure it is executed. In this model, officers have fairly little ability to act on their own, as their job is to carry out the orders exactly as HQ gives them. This method of command had proven effective for the French during WW1, and they intended to fight WW2 the same way they'd fought WW1. The drawback of this system is its lack of flexibility. If an officer sees an opportunity on the battlefield, he cannot just exploit it. He needs to report it up the chain of command, then wait until he gets orders to do so. The problem with this, of course, is that the chance to exploit this opportunity might pass in the meantime.
The German army, on the other hand, was commanded by task. Herein, an officer receives orders from HQ, say, to capture a specific position, and what material he has available, but how to do so is left up to the officer in the field, with the assumption being that the officer knows the situation infront of him better than a general in an HQ hundreds of kilometers behind the front could ever hope to. Indeed, if an officer spotted an opportunity, but he would have to go against his orders to exploit it, it was actually tolerated within the German army to exploit this opportunity, even if it was in violation od direct orders, provided the results justify the action. The drawback of this, of course, was that the high autonomy of individual officers might cause difficult situations if, for instance, two officers decided to go against their orders at the same time, and caused a big gap in their position as a result.
With that out of the way, let's get to the Dash to the Channel. Rommel saw an opportunity infront of him, a gap in the enemy lines. It was well within his authority to ignore the orders he had and charge into this gap instead, and charge he did. He just kept going at full speed after realizing that noone was there to oppose him. Now, normally, this would have gotten Rommel encircled. All it takes is for a single division to block the road he came from, and his entire division would have been doomed. However, here's the thing: After both sides realized what Rommel had just done, mobile German units rushed into the corridor he'd cut into the French lines to reinforce it, while french officers waited for HQ to give them the order to cut Rommel off. By the time that order came, German units had already reinforced Rommel's corridor, and any counterattacks were unsuccessful. In the end, Rommel just kept going until he reached Calais, and when he did, effectively encircled half the army that opposed them, eventually resulting in the evacuation in Dunkirk (aswell as several smaller, lesser known evacuations), and after that, victory in France was but a matter of time, as the anglo-british forces were now severely outnumbered.